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The April Meeting
and

The Denver Juvenile Court
ciation was held on April 2, 1928,
HE
regular
meeting
of the
Chamber
of AssoComat 12:15
in the
merce dining room.
President Robert L. Stearns presided, and first called upon Judge Charles
C. Sackman of the District Court to
make a report on behalf of the Library
Committee.
Judge Sackman reported that this
Committee, composed of Paul P. Prosser, as Chairman, and Fraser Arnold
and himself, at the suggestion of President Stearns, had consulted with Mayor Benjamin F. Stapleton and the City
Council and had obtained an appropriation of $2,000 to be used for the

maintenance, equipment and operation
of the Bar Association Library at the
Court House during the year 1928. He
acknowledged the cooperation of Mayor Stapleton, George P. Steele, a member of this Association and the Chairman of the Finance Committee of the
City Council, George Begole, City Auditor, and H. J. Raymond, Clerk of the
District Court.
The President then ann-unced that
the receipt of this money necessitated
a change in the By-Laws, which
amendment would be offered at the
annual meeting, to be held April 30,
1928.
Mr. William E. Hutton, Chairman
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of the Nominating Committee was
then called upon who made the report
mentioned elsewhere in this issue.
The President then called upon
Judge Frank McDonough, to introduce
the Honorable Robert W. Steele, Judge
of the Juvenile Court, as the speaker
of the day.
Judge McDonough, in introducing
Judge Steele, paid a tribute to the
character and attainments of his father, who was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.
He recalled the friendship that existed
between himself and Judge Steele's
father. He commented upon the great
public service being rendered by Judge
Steele in the Juvenile Court in dealing
with the problem of saving children
from crime and disgrace.
Judge Steele then delivered a most
interesting address on "Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure in the Denver Juvenile Court", which was as follows:
"The Juvenile Court was created and
may be abolished by the Legislature.
It has no general jurisdiction.
Its
powers, authority and procedure are
prescribed in detail in the original act
creating it and in various amendments
and other special acts enacted since it
came into being in 1907. Every case
filed and every matter considered by
the Court concerns, in some way, one
or more minors, although the majority
of the orders, judgments and decrees
are directed to adults. Considering
the formal trials or hearings, one day
in each week is sufficient to dispose of
the so-called children's cases, that is,
where the child itself is before the
Court for discipline, correction or commitment because- of some act done by
the child, whereas two or three days
in each week are devoted exclusively
to trials and hearings where children
are involved but where the conduct or
misconduct of adults is the real matter at issue. It was a surprise to me
to learn that in more than half of the
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cases tried, the parties on both sides
are adults and the children do not appear in Court at all. About 90% of all
the cases fall under one of three main
subdivisions of what may be called the
civil jurisdiction of the Court, namely:
1st-Cases alleging delinquency, Zndthose alleging dependency and 3rdthose charging contributory delinquency or contributory dependency.
And first of Delinquency"The first act defining a delinquent
was passed in 1903 and applied only to
children 16 years of age or under, that
is, to those who had not attained their
17th birthday. In 1923 this act was
amended and the age limit raised.
How far it went up I am in some
doubt. The original act consisted of 12
sections, all but 2 of which are still in
full force and effect. The amendment
of 1923 repeals the first section of the
old act and recites that said section
shall be amended to read as follows:
'This Act shall apply only to children
under 18 years of age,' etc. Then follows the new definition of a delinquent
child, the act stating: 'The words 'delinquent child' shall include any child
18 years of age or under such age who'
does any one of 43 things. A child
under 18 has not reached its 18th
birthday, but a child 18 or under is one
who has not reached its 19th birthday.
Inasmuch as the first portion of the
act quoted applies to the entire remaining 10 sections of the original act.
and the second part quoted is primarily a definition, I have construed the
two parts, although hopelessly conflicting, in the only way in which the entire act can be applied, namely, by
considering a delinquent as a child
who has not reached its 18th birthday.
I believe the Legislature intended to
raise the age limit two years, but this
construction raises it but one year.
In a recent decision, handed down only
last month, our Supreme Court said:
'By our so-called Delinquency statute,
a child 18 years of age or under who
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is incorrigible, or who is growing up
in idleness or crime, is declared to be
a delinquent,' but the opinion does not
state the age of the child involved in
the case, nor was the question of the
apparent conflict in the statute squarely raised or necessarily decided. In
the case of People ex rel Cruz vs. Morley, 77 Colorado 25, the Court, construing the amendment of 1923 to the original Juvenile Court Act, holds that
the Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction in all matters, except criminal
cases, concerning those 18 or under,
but the relator Cruz was a boy 17
years of age and the statute under observation includes dependency matters
as well as delinquency and there is no
ambiguity as to age in the law defining
a dependent. Consequently, in spite
of these two decisions, I still believe
the matter is open for speculation.
"Proceedings
against delinquents
are initiated by the filing of a petition.
Any reputable person, having knowledge of a child in his county who has
committed acts of delinquency, may
file the petition. Upon the filing thereof, notice or summons is issued and
served on the parents or guardian of
the child, fixing the day for the hearing not less than six days from the day
of service. The child, or some one in
its behalf, may demand a trial by jury,
which shall be granted as in other
cases unless waived, says the statute.
At the conclusion of the trial, the
child, if found to be a delinquent, is
either placed on probation under the
disciplinary care and direction of the
court, or committed to an institution.
Boys under 16 and over 10 may be
sent to the Industrial School for Boys
at Golden and kept there until they
reach the age of 18. If 16 or over,
they may be sent to the State Reformatory at Buena Vista for an indeterminate period. Girls over 6 and under
18 may be committed to the Industrial
School for Girls at Morrison, and kept
there until they reach 21.

"At present, there are over 500 boys
reporting periodically under probation
to the officers of the Court. Commitments to Golden since July 1, 1927,
number about 25. Less than 100 girls
are on probation. Commitments to
Morrison since July 1, 1927, numbering
about 20.
"It was apparently the Intention of
the framers of the act concerning delinquents and the procedure for dealing with them, to, by that act, abolish
the criminal law in so far as it applied to minors within the age of delinquency, except as to crimes of violence punishable by death or imprisonment for life where the accused was
over 16. The act expressly states that
it shall not apply to such crimes.
"In the Cruz case, referred to a moment ago, the contention was made
that a person under 18 cannot be a
criminal. One Manuel Cruz, 17 years
of age, was indicted in the district
court for burglary, larceny and receiving stolen goods, crimes not punishable by death or life imprisonment.
His plea to the jurisdiction of the district court was overruled and he
brought original proceeding in the Supreme to prohibit the district court
from proceeding. The Attorney General and two deputies appeared for
the people, the district attorney and
one deputy appeared for the District.
Judge; 10 prominent and eminent
members of the Denver Bar joined
with the attorney general for the petitioner and the Judge of the Juvenile
Court and one other prominent and
eminent member of the bar appeared
as friends of the Court. A rehearing
was granted and the matter argued
ably and adroitly on all sides. The
Court held that the District Court had
the power to try the relator Cruz, that
the criminal laws had not been abolished as to those 18 or under, that a
minor 18 or under can commit a crime
and be prosecuted as a criminal, and
that the district court, having first
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"Whether or not a trial to final determination, under a delinquency petition, alleging as an act of delinquency a violation of law which would
amount to a felony, would constitute
a bar to a subsequent prosecution in
the criminal courts for the same offense, I am not fully advised. The
district attorney is of the opinion that
it would not be a bar. I am rather
inclined to disagree with him, but have
not as yet been called upon to make
a decision.
"I am in some quandry to know just
how loose and informal the proceedings should be in delinquency cases.
Certainly the stiff formalities and atmosphere of the criminal court should
be and have been entirely done away
with. Trials are had in chambers.
Witnesses, however, especially adults,
are required to be sworn before testifying. In no case, since I have been
in the Court, has a jury trial been demanded in delinquency matters. In
the recent case decided -February,
1928-which I mentioned, the Supreme
Court said:
'Proceedings under this
act are not criminal or penal, but protective' and also said: 'We, therefore,
hold -that this is a special statutory,
civil proceedings and not a criminal action.' But the Court in that case reversed the County Court of an outside
county because the lower court refused to grant a jury trial upon request of the mother of one of the alleged delinquents, even though it appeared that the request was made after the trial had been in progress for
some time. The Court also dismissed
a petition against one boy which
charged incorrigibility when the proof
showed he had only stolen one automobile. 'This alone', says the Court,
'does not constitute either incorrigibility or growing up in idleness or crime.'
This decision, even while it states that
the proceedings are civil and protec-
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tive and not criminal, induces in me
the opinion that our Supreme Court
believes that certain rules of law and
fundamental principles of justice are
to be kept in mind even when the
Court is dealing with minors in the
capacity of parent. The New York
Court of Appeals, in a case decided
about a year ago, reversed a decision
of the Children's Court of Buffalo under a proceeding very similar to ours.
A minor had been charged with being
a delinquent in that he had committed
what would amount to burglary or larceny. He was committed to a Reform
School. The Court said"There must be a trial; the charge
against the child cannot be sustained
upon mere hearsay or surmise. The
child must first have committed the
act of burglary or of larceny before
it can be convicted of being a delinquent child. The act remains the same
and the proof of the act is equally
necessary whether we call it burglary,
larceny or delinquency.
The name
may change the result. It cannot
change the facts. The proceedings resulted in a conviction and a sentence.
Call it what we will-which deprived
the boy of his liberty. The Court in
the interest of the child called such a
proceeding a hearing and the offense
delinquency, not burglary or larceny.
The facts, however, of the charge must
be proved against the child in the
same way as if the charge were made
against an adult; that is, by competent
evidence. This was not done. The
evidence taken in this case was not
competent or sufficient to convict an
adult; therefore it was insufficient to
convict the boy. Our activities in behalf of the child may have been awakened, but the fundamental ideas of
criminal procedure have not been
changed.
These require a definite
charge, a hearing, competent proof
and a judgment. Anything less is arbitrary power.'
"I

believe nearly

three-fourths

of
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all boys brought before the Court are
charged with what would amount to
burglary or larceny or both if committed by an adult.
"The second main source of civil
jurisdiction of the Court is the Dependency statute. Like delinquents, a
dependent was originally defined as a
child under 16 who is dependent upon
the public, etc. By the act of 1923,
a dependent child is one under 18 who,
etc. This amendment, however, goes
even further than raising the age limit,
and takes in a class of children seldom recognized by legislative fiat,
namely, unborn children. 'The laws
of this state', says the statute, 'concerning dependent or neglected children, or persons who cause, encourage
or contribute thereto, shall be construed to include all children under
the age mentioned herein from the
time of their conception and during
the months before birth.' It is due to
the unwillingness on the part of the
medical profession to make positive
statements, and not the fault of the
law, that the court has been unable
to give this provision the full effect
intended by its language.
"Here again, proceedings are instituted by petition which any person,
resident of the county, may file. Citation or summons issues, fixing the day
for the hearing, not less than two days
after service.
"Upon the hearing, if the child is
found to be dependent, it may be committed to the State Home for Dependent Children, or the Court may make
such disposition of the child by adoption or guardianship or otherwise as
seems best for its moral and physical
welfare. Most of the cases filed under this authority concern abandoned,
illegitimate, homeless or neglected
children, usually of very tender age,
and in nearly all of these, the children
are sent to the State Home. There
are a great many cases, however, filed
under this statute, where custody as
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between parents or others is the main
issue. A controversy over the custody
of a child, makes the child a dependent, according to the statute, and many
parents institute bitter contests in the
Juvenile Court for custody of their
children. Sometimes they are divorced
and oftentimes the divorce court has
made orders awarding custody to one
or the other.
"The amendment of 1923 to the original Juvenile Court Act contains
three somewhat inconsistent statements
in the same paragraph. 'Such Courts'
(meaning Juvenile Courts) says the
statute, 'shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases concerning dependent
children,' etc., 'provided that nothing
in this act shall be construed to revoke or interfere with the jurisdiction,
practice or proceedings as now provided by law in other courts of record
in this state in cases in such courts
relating to the custody or disposition
of children in divorce cases, provided
that the disposition of children in any
divorce case shall not be held to interfere with the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court in cases concerning the
dependency of such children. Fortunately, our Supreme- Court has untangled this apparent scramble. In the
case of People vs. Juvenile Court, 75
Colorado, 493, an original proceeding
for a Writ of Prohibition, it appeared
that the district court, in a divorce
case, had awarded the custody of three
children to the father, but had granted
a stay. During the stay, the mother
filed a petition in the Juvenile Court,
alleging that the children were dependent because a controversy was waging over their custody. The Juvenile
Court, over the objection of the father,
awarded the children to the mother.
After quoting the portions of the Act
which I have quoted, the Court said:
'We must harmonize these sentences
if we can. We have concluded that
the most reasonable construction of
the whole section is that the Juvenile
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Court, having exclusive jurisdiction in
matters concerning the dependency of
children, is not to be deprived of that
jurisdiction by proceedings with reference to children in the divorce court,
that the divorce court may proceed
with reference to children as heretofore, subject to the power of the Juvenile Court to deal with those children if they are or become dependents.
The result in the present case would
be that since the children are accused
of dependency in the Juvenile Court,
it can proceed, and when that dependency is denied, it has jurisdiction to
try that issue of fact.'
"This is the only harmonious interpretation which could have been made,
but the effect of the decision and the
statute is that parents in a divorce
suit may, as they often do, engage in
bitter fights over custody of children.
Many days are often consumed in the
taking of test imony as to fitness or unfitness of one parent or the other. At
the conclusion of the hearing, and after the divorce, court judge has struggled to make a just award, there is
nothing to prevent the losing party
from immediately filing a dependency
petition in the Juyenile Court and going through the same trial over again,
and this can be done without the payment of any docket fees, witness
fees, sheriff's fees or other court
charges or expenses, and can also be
tried to a jury if either side requests it.
"For your information, a dependent
child is defined to be "any child under
the age of 18 years who is dependent
upon the public for support, or who is
destitute, homeless or abandoned; or
who has not proper parents; care of
guardianship, or who in the opinion of
the Court, is entitled to support or.
care by its parent or parents where
it appears that the parent or parents
are failing or refusing to support or
care for said child; or who habitually
begs or receives alms, or who is found
living in any house of ill fame, or with
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any vicious or disreputable persons,
or whose home, by reason of neglect,
immorality or depravity on the part
of its parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such child, or whose environment is such, or about whose custody a controversy is such as to warrant the State, in the interest of the
child, in assuming or determining its
guardianship, or in determining what
may be for the best interest of said
child.'
"The third general classification of
civic jurisdiction concerns those who
contribute to dependency, neglect or
delinquency, and was conferred upon
the Juvenile and County Courts by act
of the Legislature, comprising 10 sections, approved April 28; 1909.
No
case has ever been reviewed by the
Supreme Court involving this statute.
"Briefly, it provides that any person
who shall encourage, cause or contribute to the. dependency, neglect or
delinquency of a child, shall be proceeded against as provided by the act.
"Again, a petition is the. first step
which any reputable person may file.
Summons thereupon issued, requiring
all persons named to appear at a certain time not less than 6 days after
service. If the petitioner makes affidavit that there are good reasons to
believe the person proceeded against
will leave the jurisdiction of the Court
before the day set for hearing, a warrant may be issued, directed to the
sheriff commanding him to bring the
person named forthwith before the
Court, whereupon the Court may make
such interlocutory orders as are proper in the premises.
"If, upon the hearing of the case in
court, the court is satisfied, says the
statute 'that the person proceeded
against is responsible for or has
caused, encouraged or contributed to
the neglect, dependency or delinquency of the child or children named, the
court may enter judgment determin-
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ing such facts and requiring such person to do or omit to do any act or acts
complained of in the petition.
"Trial by jury may be had if demanded and if the finding of the jury
be against the person tried, the verdict shall so state, in which event the
court, in its discretion, may enter such
judgment as it seems needful in the
premises.
"This statute is the authority under
which about 60 cases a month are filed
by mothers of children, separated from
the fathers, asking that the fathers be
made to support the children, and
naturally, under it come many cases
concerning illegitimate unborn children. About $60,000.00 a year is paid
into court under orders made in such
cases and an average of 5 a week are
hearing on citations or attachments in
contempt proceedings for failure to
comply with the orders of the Court.
In trials concerning illegitimate, unborn children, the Court plays many
Sometimes the parties have
roles.
lawyers, more often not. When they
have not, the court is required to act
as counsel for each side. After the
evidence is all in, the Court resolves
itself into a jury of matrony under a
writ de ventre inspiciendo and deliberates on the question of whether or not
there is a child. Having determined
that there is, the court then considers
whether or not the respondent in the
case is the father, and having found
that he is, sits as a chancellor and
makes orders for payment of maternity expenses and future care and support of both mother and child. In all
cases where dependency is alleged, the
authority of the court is fairly clear
from the statute, but in cases charging
contributory delinquency, such is not
the case. Many adult men, sometimes
very old, in one instance 83, in another
past 70, are brought before the court,
charged with contributing to juvenile
delinquency by taking indecent liberties with children, or with teaching

them to steal or inducing or encouraging them to do many other prohibited
and reprehensible acts. To order such
a person to 'omit doing the acts complained of' and let him go would be
utterly useless. Yet It is difficult to
find express authority in the statute
for imposing fines or imprisonment.
Such authority was apparently contemplated because the act further
states that the court may release the
person proceeded against on probation. The right to release presupposes
the right to hold and without the latter power, the statute, so far as it relates to delinquency, is wholly ineffectual.
"The Court has, as you know, concurrent jurisdiction with the district
and county courts in all criminal cases
where the accused is a minor, or
where, regardless of the age of the defendant, the offense was committed
against a minor.
"It also has jurisdiction in actions
for annulment of marriage where either of the parties is under 21 at the
date of the filing of the complaint. No
new or additional grounds for annulment are set out in the statute, giving
the Juvenile Court jurisdiction and
consequently, the common law governs these actions in the Juvenile
Court as in any other court. The Court
has exclusive jurisdiction to grant
adoption of minors and hardly a day
goes by without one or more decrees
of adoption being executed. The Court
also has jurisdiction under Ch. 147
Compiled Laws 1921, known as the
Redemption of Offenders Act. I have
had no experience with this act for
the reason that since I have been in
the Court no cases have been filed under it.
"There are two things I would like
to have to aid me in conducting the
business of the Court.
"One is an unexpurgated edition of
an autobiography of King Solomon.
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"The other is more lawyers representing litigants in the Court. I suppose I can secure neither of them.
"I can, however, and do hereby in-
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vii. you into the Court and I earnestly
solicit your assistance.
"Humbly beseeching, your orator
will ever pray."

Reports of Committees For the Past Year
1927-1928
Note: Practically all of the committee reports are printed in full.
In
some few instances exhibits attached
to the reports have not been printed.
Mention is made of that fact, however,
and the complete report is on file with
the Secretary. Such of the committees
whose work is of a continuing nature
will submit reports at the completion
of the year's work.

Banquet Committee
For the Banquet Committee of the
Denver Bar Association I desire to
report to you that the annual banquet
was duly held February 22, 1928, on
which occasion the Honorable Silas H.
Strawn, President of the American Bar
Association, was our guest.
More than two hundred members of
the Association attended the banquet
over which Mr. Roger H. Wolcott presided as Toastmaster. The only speeches of the evening were addresses by
Mr. James Grafton Rogers and Mr.
Strawn.
I wish to express my appreciation of
the work of the Committee in arranging for the meeting and the conduct of
the same, and to especially express appreciation for the hearty cooperation
evidenced by all the members of the
Association who were asked to assist
in connection with the meeting.
Very truly yours,
E. G. KNOWLES,

Chairman.

Judicial Salaries Committee
Your Committee on Judicial Salaries
reports as follows:
The work of this Committee has been
carried on with vigor under the able
leadership of George P. Steele, Chairman, and under his direction, complete
and comprehensive plans have been
made and extensive preliminary work
done, which it is hoped and believed
will bring about the adoption of
Amendment No. 1 at the November
election.
Chairman Steele has been assured
the support of many of the great newspapers in Colorado who have told him
that they are favorable to the amendment and will work for its adoption.
Considerable publicity has already been
obtained for the amendment and much
further work remains to be done to
acquaint the electors with the necessity, propriety and justice of raising
judicial salaries.
In connection with the work of the
Denver Committee, a Speakers Bureau
has been organized composed of thirty
or more members of the Denver Bar,
who will appear at luncheon clubs,
service clubs, public meetings and secular gatherings of every sort and nature, who will present to the various
audiences the merits of the amendment
to raise judicial salaries. The Speakers Bureau is under the direction of
Fred Y. Holland, Secretary of the Committee, and is composed of the following members of the Denver Bar: A.

